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so the People’s Liberation Army would
“likely choose the historical responsibility of keeping Taiwan part of China”;
Thacik counters that the Taiwanese
“will not permit an accommodation of
China’s demands that Taiwan become
subordinate to Beijing.” This standoff is
a recipe for disaster, but one that is all
too often obscured and glossed over
rather than highlighted.
Finally, U.S.-China military relations
are addressed by Paul Godwin and Alfred Wilhelm, Jr., while U.S.-China relations in general are outlined by
Richard Thornton and David Lai. These
authors again present a mixed bag, with
Godwin warning of a U.S.-Chinese “escalation dynamic expanding the scope
of the war beyond the intent of either
adversary”; Wilhelm calling for removing “all remaining military-related
sanctions on the PRC” and promoting
increased military-to-military talks;
Thornton advocating measures to
“curb” Chinese ambitions “now before
China becomes too strong to control
and we find ourselves on the path to
war ”; and Lai arguing that the China
threat has been “overblown.” Since the
book does not include a much-needed
conclusion to sort through this morass,
or an index to assist in locating particular topics of interest, the reader is left
with the unfortunate impression that
the experts could not agree with each
other, much less with the editors, on
what final message they should present
to their audience.
While many essays in this book are
quite good, they do not work well as a
whole. One is left with the feeling that
the editors published whatever they
were given, with one essay on the air
force numbering almost forty pages,
while a scant four pages are devoted to
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China’s all-important relations with
Russia, where the bulk of the PLA’s
most deadly weapons are purchased.
Furthermore, there is no chapter devoted specifically to Sino-Japanese relations, though various authors admit
that Japan is China’s nearest great
power and maritime rival. Equally relevant topics not raised by this book include rising tensions over North Korea;
China’s space program and the rapid
growth of its missile forces; territorial
disputes in the South China Sea; and
the U.S.-led efforts with Japan, and
perhaps even Taiwan, to build theater
and national missile defense. For these
reasons, this book falls short as an examination of the true nature of U.S.Chinese relations.
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College

Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars:
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003,
295pp. $22.99

In this work, Gil Merom, an assistant
professor of political science at Tel Aviv
University, sets forth an intriguing
proposition based on case studies of
conflicts occurring in the second half of
the twentieth century. Democracies, he
argues, fail to win small wars because,
as democracies, they are unable to bear
either the casualties, particularly from
among the “educated middle class,”
that such wars produce or the brutality
winning such wars requires. If valid, the
implications of proving such a hypothesis are significant. For starters, a hard
blow would be dealt to the international relations school of realism and its
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offshoots. These models tend to view
relative national power, especially military power, as the primary determinant of
military success—a tenet that Merom’s
conclusions seem to refute. To the contrary, his findings would seem to offer
substantial vindication to analysts and
scholars who believe constituencies in a
democratic society’s domestic political
system are the true drivers of such a
state’s international behavior.
While important to political scientists
and international relations scholars,
Merom’s question could not be more
timely for national leaders struggling to
advance their interests in the real world,
for his work suggests that an entire
family of conflict is not likely to be won
by democracies. It would therefore follow that democracies should either
avoid small wars altogether, strike and
win before public opinion can react, or
handle these conflicts with nonmilitary
instruments. Put more bluntly, it would
imply that the United States may be
unable to secure victory in either the
Middle East or Central Asia, because
the American people will not condone
the type of action required to win these
wars and keep casualties low. Merom
includes the intentional targeting of
noncombatants, the use of concentration camps, intentional deprivation of
food and water to a civilian population, forced exile, torture, and indiscriminate bombing as some of the
brutal means traditionally used to win
small wars.
It is impossible not to see similarities
between Merom’s case studies and current U.S. operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. However, a closer reading reveals not only significant questions but
weaknesses concerning Merom’s work.
First, it rapidly becomes apparent that
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his case studies involve counterinsurgencies, not the much broader
spectrum of conflict to which the term
“small wars” refers. Thus the successful
invasions of Grenada, Panama, and
Haiti are not examined. Neither are
such successful limited interventions
as the French operations ARTEMIS and
TOURQUOISE in Africa, the British in
Sierra Leone, or the United States in
Liberia. In fact, Merom focuses on
guerrilla warfare, a type of small war
identified by C. E. Callwell, who wrote
the book on small wars in the eighteenth
century, as “the most unfavorable shape
which a campaign [can] take for the
regular troops.”
The need for brutal measures to ensure
victory is also an assumption that deserves to be challenged. Merom does
not make the case that the only way to
win against a counterinsurgency is
through such methods. While he identifies several historical examples of great
powers embracing brutal methods to
defeat insurgencies in the past, he does
not prove that they made the difference
between victory and defeat. Nor does he
prove that such measures must be part
of a future winning arsenal.
There are also problems with his selection of cases. Merom chose three failed
counterinsurgencies to make his point;
however, Malaya in the 1950s, Greece
in the 1940s, and Central America in
the 1980s and 1990s would seem to offer obvious historical counterexamples
to Merom’s thesis. Interestingly,
Merom, on one page and in one footnote, acknowledges the existence of the
British involvement in Malaya, but he
does not identify this conflict as a successful postwar counterinsurgency. Thus
it would seem unwarranted at this point
to claim that Merom’s conclusions
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apply to all small wars, or even to all
counterinsurgencies.
A related if less telling criticism is that
the three selected conflicts are clearly
grouped at the more robust end of the
small-wars spectrum. The size of a war
may be measured by intensity (number
of deaths over a given time), duration
(amount of time over which killing occurs), or scale (number of total deaths).
Other units of measure could be fiscal
cost, percentage of armed forces engaged, or the extent to which a state’s
vital national interests are at risk. None
of the wars Merom looks at were quick,
low-cost affairs. Perhaps they should
not be included in the “small war” category at all.
That said, this book is not without
merit. It certainly suggests several areas
for future research. Of these, one of the
more intriguing would be the use of locally recruited military forces as a
means to achieve victory in counterinsurgencies and other forms of small
wars without generating adverse domestic public opinion. Such forces have
traditionally had key roles in small wars
throughout history. Merom’s findings
suggest that the need for such units may
be bigger than ever.
When it comes to the specific cases of
Vietnam, Algeria, and Lebanon,
Merom’s scholarship and argument are
convincing. Public opinion and war fatigue, aversion to casualties, and refusal
to endorse certain methods of warfare
clearly impacted national decision making in these cases. Merom demonstrates
that forces unleashed in the various domestic political systems examined in
this study had a profound impact on
war prosecution and termination. Any
scholar wishing to understand these
conflicts in deeper detail should read
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the appropriate chapters of this book.
Again, it should be noted that it is impossible not to see similarities between
these cases and current U.S. operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The potential for such domestically
driven forces to impact national security policy is clearly something that
should be of interest to any modern
political-military leader or scholar. For,
as this review is being published, U.S.
and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are determinedly attempting
to defeat counterinsurgencies while trying to avoid initiating the forces Merom
examines. So while Merom’s work does
not provide the key to the problem of
counterinsurgency, it does seem to provide at least a significant piece of the
puzzle.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Ambrose, Stephen E. To America: Personal Reflections of an Historian. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2003. 288pp. $24

The United States is the richest and
most powerful country in the world.
Yet over two hundred years ago it began as thirteen colonies at the edge of a
continental wilderness. Stephen
Ambrose, an eminent historian and
skilled writer, has used this short, readable book to explain how the United
States made this amazing transformation. He attributes its success as a nation to the American spirit.
The American spirit originated with the
founding fathers and was further developed by presidents Andrew Jackson,
Ulysses S. Grant, Franklin and Theodore
Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.
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